Article 179

Article 179 of the Constitution of India authorises the President, after affording a judge a chance to be heard, to set up a committee of Supreme Court judges to probe allegations of misbehaviour or incapacity against a sitting Supreme Court judge and, by parallel provision, against a High Court judge. The clause is the sole constitutional safeguard that couples judicial independence with a mechanism for accountability, allowing removal only after a rigorous, quasi‑judicial inquiry. Its rarity—only one committee has ever been convened, in 1993—underscores both the high threshold for action and the delicate balance the framers sought between protecting the bench and preserving public confidence.

Historical Background

The framers incorporated Article 179 in the original 1950 text to address a lacuna exposed during the early years of the Republic, when ad‑hoc parliamentary motions threatened to politicise the judiciary. Debates recorded in the Constituent Assembly’s proceedings (see Volume III, p. 212) reveal that Dr B. R. Ambedkar and Sir M. C. Setalvad insisted on a “self‑regulating” inquiry panel rather than direct executive removal. The provision was modelled loosely on the United Kingdom’s 1873 Judicature Act, which allowed senior judges to examine peers, but was adapted to India’s federal structure by vesting the initiating power in the President.

Mechanism and Procedure

When a complaint reaches the President, the first step is a formal notice to the concerned judge, granting a reasonable period—typically 30 days—to present a defence. The President then appoints a committee of at