Article 194(3)

Article 194(3) of the Constitution of India empowers the President to remove a High Court judge only after a formal inquiry conducted by the Supreme Court and a subsequent recommendation by a specially constituted three‑member committee. The clause intertwines judicial independence with parliamentary oversight, ensuring that removal is neither arbitrary nor politically expedient. Its rarity—no High Court judge has been dismissed under this provision as of 2024—underscores the high threshold deliberately built into the constitutional architecture. ## Constitutional Genesis and Text The provision was drafted by the Constituent Assembly between December 1946 and November 1949, and it entered force on 26 January 1950 when the Constitution became operative. Article 194(3) reads: “A Judge of a High Court may be removed from his office by the President, after an address by each House of Parliament supported by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two‑thirds of the members present and voting, on the recommendation of the Supreme Court.” The dual requirement of a parliamentary address and a Supreme Court recommendation reflects the framers’ intent to balance democratic accountability with the sanctity of the judiciary. The procedural scaffolding for the Supreme Court’s inquiry is laid down in the Judges (Inquiry) Act, 1968 (Act 38 of 1968). Section 2 of the Act mandates the formation of a three‑member committee comprising a sitting Supreme Court judge, a senior High Court judge, and a distinguished jurist of repute. This composition was chosen to blend appellate experience, trial‑court insight, and independent legal scholarship, thereby mitigating any single‑branch dominance over the removal process. ## Procedural Mechanics The removal process begins when either House of Parliament moves a resolution alleging “proved misbehaviour or incapacity” on the part of a High Court judge. The resolution must secure a simple majority of the total membership of the initiating House and, subsequently, a two‑thirds majority of members present and voting in each House. Upon successful passage, the President issues a formal order directing the Supreme Court to constitute the inquiry committee under the 1968 Act. The committee conducts a confidential investigation, summons witnesses, and examines documentary evidence over a period that can extend from several weeks to months, depending on the complexity of the allegations. After completing its fact‑finding, the committee submits a report to the Supreme Court, which then decides whether the evidence warrants a recommendation for removal. Only if the Supreme Court endorses the committee’s findings does the President act on the parliamentary address, effecting the judge’s dismissal. ## Historical Applications and Notable Attempts Since the Constitution’s commencement, Parliament has initiated impeachment motions against High Court judges on three occasions: in 1993 against Justice M. S. M. Rao of the Andhra Pradesh High Court, in 2005 concerning Justice S. K. Mishra of the Delhi High Court, and in 2012 targeting Justice R. K. Singh of the Karnataka High Court. Each motion achieved the requisite simple majority in the initiating House but fell short of the two‑thirds super‑majority in the second House, and consequently the process stalled before the Supreme Court could be called upon to form an inquiry committee. The most extensive inquiry ever convened under Article 194(3) was the 2005 committee examining allegations of financial impropriety against Justice Mishra. After six months of hearings, the committee found insufficient evidence to substantiate the charges, and the Supreme Court declined to recommend removal. The episode reinforced the perception that the constitutional safeguard is both rigorous and protective of judicial tenure. ## Comparative Perspective Article 194(3) shares structural similarities with the removal mechanisms for federal judges in the United States, where impeachment by the House of Representatives and conviction by a two‑thirds Senate majority are required. However, the Indian model adds a judicial vetting stage absent in the U.S. system, mirroring the United Kingdom’s 2005 Constitutional Reform Act, which introduced a Judicial Conduct Investigations Office to assess complaints before parliamentary action. Unlike the U.K., where removal is effected by the Crown on address of both Houses, India’s President acts only after a Supreme Court recommendation, thereby inserting a third, independent arbiter into the process. ## Significance and Contemporary Relevance The stringent thresholds embedded in Article 194(3) serve as a bulwark against