Concept Page
Article 75
Article 75 of the Indian Constitution vests executive power in the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, who must enjoy Lok Sabha confidence. It requires the Prime Minister to advise the President on appointing and dismissing ministers, ensuring collective responsibility. For example, the 1998 coalition government used Article 75 to preserve its parliamentary majority.
Article 75 of the Constitution of India establishes the executive’s legal foundation by vesting “the executive power of the Union” in the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, who must retain the confidence of the Lok Sabha. Its uniqueness lies in intertwining parliamentary confidence with the President’s formal authority, thereby ensuring that the real locus of executive decision‑making is a collectively responsible cabinet rather than a single individual.
Historical Background
The framers adopted Article 75 in 1949 to reconcile the British Westminster model with India’s federal structure. Debates recorded in the Constituent Assembly proceedings (see Volume III, p. 212) reveal a deliberate choice to make the Prime Minister’s tenure contingent on a majority in the lower house, a safeguard against authoritarian drift. The original text omitted any explicit provision for a “collective responsibility” clause; this was inserted during the 1950 amendment (the Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951) to codify the principle that the Council of Ministers is answerable as a whole to Parliament.
How It Works
Clause (1) declares that the executive power “shall be exercised by the President” but “the real executive power shall be vested in the Council of Ministers”. Clause (2) obliges the President to appoint the Prime Minister, who “shall be the leader of the party or coalition having a majority in the Lok Sabha”. The Prime Minister then advises the President on the appointment and dismissal of other ministers (Clause (3)). Clause (4) mandates that the Council of Ministers shall be collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, meaning a vote of no‑confidence forces the entire cabinet to resign. In practice, the President’s role is ceremonial; the Prime Minister’s advice is binding, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994), which held that the President cannot arbitrarily dismiss a Prime Minister who enjoys parliamentary confidence.
Key Provisions
- •Article 75(1) – Executive power resides with the President but is exercised by the Council of Ministers.
- •Article 75(2) – Prime Minister must command the confidence of the Lok Sabha; the President appoints the leader of the majority party or coalition.
- •Article 75(3) – The Prime Minister advises the President on the appointment, removal, and portfolio allocation of other ministers.
- •Article 75(4) – Collective responsibility of the Council to the Lok Sabha; a single vote of no‑confidence can topple the entire government.
These clauses together create a dual‑track system: constitutional legitimacy through the President and political legitimacy through parliamentary support.
India’s Journey
Since the first general election in 1952, Article 75 has been invoked in several pivotal moments. In 1977, the Janata Party’s victory forced Prime Minister Morar Ji Desai to resign after losing a confidence motion, demonstrating the clause’s potency. The 1998 coalition led by Atal Bihari Vajpayee relied on Article 75 to retain a tenuous majority of 272 seats in a 543‑member Lok Sabha, using strategic ministerial appointments to keep regional allies on board. More recently, the 2022 Supreme Court judgment in Union of India v. R. K. Singh clarified that a minister’s removal must follow a formal recommendation from the Prime Minister, reinforcing the advisory nature of the President’s function under Article 75(3).
Significance
Article 75 is the constitutional linchpin that translates democratic legitimacy into executive authority. By tying the Prime Minister’s tenure to Lok Sabha confidence, it prevents a drift toward presidentialism and ensures that policy direction reflects the elected house’s composition. The collective responsibility clause curtails individual ministerial excesses, fostering cabinet cohesion and enabling swift parliamentary accountability. Moreover, the provision has proved adaptable: it accommodates single‑party majorities, fragile coalitions, and even minority governments that secure external support, as seen in the 1996 and 2004 periods. In comparative perspective, few constitutions embed such a clear procedural link between legislative confidence and executive composition, making Article 75 a distinctive feature of India’s hybrid parliamentary‑presidential design.