Constitution (99th Amendment) Act 2014

The Constitution (99th Amendment) Act 2014 introduced Article 124A to the Indian Constitution, creating the National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) as a statutory body to replace the long‑standing collegium system for appointing judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Its passage marked the most ambitious attempt to formalise judicial appointments through a mixed‑membership panel, sparking a constitutional showdown that would later reshape the balance between judicial independence and executive accountability. ## Origins and Historical Background The collegium system, emerging from the Supreme Court’s judgments in Supreme Court Judges (Appointment) Act 1993 and Supreme Court Judges (Appointment) 1998, vested the power to recommend appointments solely in the hands of senior judges. By the early 2010s, critics—including the Supreme Court Advocates‑on‑Record Association—argued that the collegium lacked transparency, was prone to nepotism, and excluded any external oversight. In response, the Union government introduced the National Judicial Appointments Commission Bill in February 2014, which Parliament passed on 27 August 2014 and which received presidential assent on 13 September 2014, thereby enacting the 99th Amendment. The amendment was championed by the then‑Law Minister Ashwani Kumar and supported by a broad coalition of legal scholars who saw a statutory mechanism as a means to democratise the judiciary. Simultaneously, the Supreme Court expressed reservations, warning that any dilution of its constitutional prerogative could imperil the basic structure doctrine—a principle that the Court has repeatedly invoked to protect core features of the Constitution. ## Key Provisions of the 99th Amendment Article 124A, inserted by the amendment, defines the composition, appointment procedure, and tenure of the NJAC. The commission consists of the Chief Justice of India (CJI), two senior Supreme Court judges, the Union Minister of Law and Justice, and two eminent persons—each drawn from a different zone among the four zones prescribed by the government. The amendment stipulates that the NJAC shall recommend names for appointment, and that the President shall act on these recommendations after consulting the Governor of the respective state. Removal of any NJAC member, including the CJI, requires a resolution passed by a majority of not less than two‑thirds of the total membership of each House of Parliament, mirroring the stringent safeguards applied to constitutional offices such as the Comptroller and Auditor General. The amendment also mandates that the NJAC operate under a transparent code of conduct, with its deliberations recorded and made publicly available, a departure from the collegium’s secretive proceedings. ## Mechanism of the National Judicial Appointments Commission Under the NJAC framework, the commission convenes to consider vacancies in the Supreme Court and High Courts. A candidate must secure a majority of votes from the seven members; the CJI’s vote carries a weight of two, effectively granting the judiciary a decisive influence while still requiring concurrence from the executive and eminent persons. Once a consensus is reached, the NJAC forwards its recommendation to the President, who, after consulting the relevant Governor, issues the formal appointment order. The amendment also introduced a “seniority‑plus‑merit” criterion, obliging the commission to balance the traditional seniority rule with an assessment of professional competence, integrity, and representation of diverse legal perspectives. This dual‑criteria approach was intended to curb the perception of caste‑based or regional bias that had occasionally surfaced under the collegium system. ## Current Status and Judicial Review The NJAC’s existence was short‑lived. In the landmark judgment Supreme Court Judges (Appointment) and Tenure v. Union of India (16 October 2015), a five‑to‑four majority of the Supreme Court struck down Article 124A as violative of the basic structure, particularly the independence of the judiciary. The Court held that the inclusion of a political minister and the two eminent persons compromised the separation of powers, rendering the amendment unconstitutional. Consequently, the NJAC Act 2014 was also declared void, and the collegium system was reinstated. Although the 99th Amendment remains formally part of the Constitution, its operative provisions are effectively inoperative pending a possible legislative redesign. Subsequent attempts to amend the amendment—such as the 115th Amendment in 2020, which dealt with unrelated electoral provisions—have not revived the NJAC. The Supreme Court continues to function under the collegium, albeit with ongoing calls for internal reforms to enhance transparency. ## Significance and Legacy The 99th Amendment stands as a rare instance