National Judicial Accountability Commission Act, 2006

National Judicial Accountability Commission Act, 2006 is a statute that sought to create an independent body— the National Judicial Accountability Commission (NJAC)— tasked with overseeing the conduct, appointment, and removal of judges of the Supreme Court and High Courts. Enacted to translate the 99th Constitutional Amendment’s vision of a more transparent judiciary, the Act was unique in blending judicial, executive, and civil‑society participation within a single accountability mechanism, a departure from the traditionally insular collegium system.

Origins / Historical Background

The idea of a statutory accountability commission emerged after the Supreme Court’s 1993 Judges Case, which institutionalised the collegium for judicial appointments. Concerns over opacity prompted the Law Ministry to draft the National Judicial Accountability Commission Bill, introduced in Lok Sabha on 30 August 2006 by Minister H. R. Bhardwaj. The Bill was intended to give effect to the 99th Constitutional Amendment (passed 23 December 2005), which inserted Article 124A, empowering Parliament to legislate on the appointment and removal of judges. Although the Bill cleared both houses in 2006, it lay dormant until the 2014 National Judicial Accountability Commission Act was finally passed, aligning statutory language with the earlier amendment.

Key Provisions

Section 2 of the Act defines the NJAC’s six‑member composition: the Chief Justice of India (CJI), the two senior-most Supreme Court judges, the Union Law Minister, and two “eminent persons” selected by a committee comprising the CJI, the Law Minister, and the Leader of the Opposition in the Lok Sabha. Section 3 enumerates the commission’s functions, including vetting candidates for elevation to the Supreme Court and High Courts, and conducting inquiries into allegations of misconduct, corruption, or incapacity. Section 4 outlines the removal procedure: a judge may be removed only after the NJAC finds “proved misbehaviour or incapacity,” followed by a resolution passed by a two‑thirds majority of each House of Parliament, mirroring the constitutional removal clause in Article 124(4).

How It Works / Mechanism

When a complaint is lodged—either by a litigant, a fellow judge, or a civil‑society organisation—the NJAC initiates a preliminary inquiry within 30 days. If the complaint appears prima facie, a full‑scale investigation is launched, granting the judge the right to legal representation and to present evidence. The commission’s findings are recorded in a report submitted to the President, who then forwards it to Parliament. A joint parliamentary committee reviews the report; if it recommends removal, the resolution must secure a two‑thirds majority in both the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha before the President can issue an order of removal. For appointments, the NJAC forwards a shortlist of candidates to the President, who formally appoints judges based on the commission’s recommendation.

Current Status / Implementation

The NJAC Act never entered into force. On 16 July 2015, a five‑judge Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, in Supreme Court Judges (Appointment, etc.) and Judicial Accountability Bill, 2014 (popularly known as the NJAC case), struck down both the 99th Amendment and the NJAC Act by a 4:1 majority. The Court held that the inclusion of the Law Minister and “eminent persons” violated the basic structure doctrine, compromising judicial independence. Consequently, the collegium system was reinstated, and the Act remains a dead letter, cited only in academic and reformist debates.

Significance

Despite its nullification, the NJAC Act sparked a nationwide discourse on the balance between judicial independence and accountability. It foregrounded the tension between a self‑regulating judiciary and democratic oversight, influencing subsequent proposals such as the 2020 Judicial Accountability Bill, which seeks a more limited oversight mechanism. The Act also highlighted the constitutional limits on legislative interference, reinforcing the Supreme Court’s role as guardian of the basic structure. For scholars and policymakers, the NJAC episode remains a pivotal case study in constitutional design, illustrating how attempts to reform entrenched institutions can reshape, even temporarily, the architecture of a nation’s legal system.