National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act

The National Judicial Appointments Commission (NJAC) Act, 2014 was a landmark but short-lived legislative attempt to overhaul India’s judicial appointments system by replacing the collegium system—a judge-led selection process—with a mixed commission of judges, politicians, and legal experts. Enacted by Parliament in August 2014 as the 99th Constitutional Amendment, it marked the first (and only) time India formally tried to shift judicial appointments from an exclusively judicial process to one involving the executive and civil society. The Supreme Court struck it down in October 2015 in a 4:1 majority verdict, declaring it unconstitutional for violating the basic structure doctrine—specifically, judicial independence. The NJAC’s brief existence remains a defining moment in India’s constitutional debates on separation of powers.

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Origins / Historical Background

The NJAC emerged from decades of tension between the judiciary and the executive over judicial appointments. Until 1993, appointments to the Supreme Court and High Courts were formally made by the President (i.e., the executive) under Article 124(2) and Article 217, but in practice, the government often had the final say. This changed with the Second Judges Case (1993), where the Supreme Court invented the collegium system—a group of senior judges who would recommend appointments, sidelining the executive’s role. The Third Judges Case (1998) expanded this to a five-judge collegium for Supreme Court appointments, solidifying judicial primacy.

By the 2010s, criticisms of the collegium system grew: delays in appointments, lack of transparency, and allegations of nepotism. The UPA government first proposed a Judicial Appointments Commission (JAC) Bill in 2013, but it lapsed. The NDA government, led by Narendra Modi, revived it in 2014, pushing through the NJAC Act and the 99th Amendment with rare cross-party support (including Congress). The law was notified on 31 December 2014, but petitions challenging its validity reached the Supreme Court within weeks.

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How It Works / Mechanism

The NJAC was designed as a six-member body with a carefully balanced composition:

• •The Chief Justice of India (CJI) as chairperson
• •The two next senior Supreme Court judges
• •The Union Law Minister
• •Two "eminent persons" nominated by a committee of the CJI, Prime Minister, and Leader of the Opposition

For an appointment to proceed, any two members could veto a candidate, ensuring no single entity dominated. The law also introduced elaborate eligibility criteria for judges, including minimum age (45 for High Court judges) and a public complaints mechanism to scrutinize nominees. Proponents argued this would bring transparency, accountability, and executive-judiciary cooperation, while critics feared it would politicize appointments by giving the government indirect control.

The NJAC’s procedures were spelled out in Section 5–12 of the Act, including timelines for recommendations (e.g., the President had to decide within 90 days) and provisions for reconsideration if the President returned a name. However, the Supreme Court’s 2015 verdict (Supreme Court Advocates-on-Record Association v. Union of India) held that the veto power of two members (including non-judges) undermined judicial independence, violating the basic structure doctrine first articulated in Kesavananda Bharati (1973).

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Significance

The NJAC controversy was never just about appointments—it was a clash of constitutional visions. The Supreme Court’s decision reaffirmed that judicial independence is non-negotiable, even if it means an imperfect system like the collegium persists. The verdict also expanded the basic structure doctrine, clarifying that judicial primacy in appointments is now part of India’s constitutional DNA.

Yet the episode exposed deeper flaws. The collegium system, though upheld, remains opaque and slow: as of 2023, India has ~40% vacancies in High Courts, with some waiting over two years for appointments. The NJAC’s failure led to incremental reforms, like the 2017 Memorandum of Procedure (MoP), which introduced written reasons for collegium decisions and a permanent secretariat, but transparency remains limited.

Internationally, India’s judge-led system is an outlier. Most democracies—from the US (Senate confirmations) to the UK (Judicial Appointments Commission)—involve the executive or independent bodies in appointments. The NJAC debate thus reflects a uniquely Indian dilemma: how to balance judicial autonomy with democratic accountability in a system where trust in institutions is often low. The question lingers—if not the NJAC, then what?