GS2Governance & Social Justice·30 Jul 2026·3 min read

The Numbers That Matter

On July 29, 2026, Rahul Gandhi publicly blamed Union Home Minister Amit Shah for police use of pellet guns and nail‑studded batons on Delhi student protesters and was denied the floor in the Lok Sabha. The episode reignites the unfinished agenda of police reform championed by the Prakash Singh case, highlighting systemic accountability gaps. Meanwhile, an ADR report shows that 45% of India’s chief ministers have criminal cases pending, underscoring broader concerns about law‑enforcement credibility.

The Numbers That Matter
  • Criminal Cases Against State Leaders and Police Brutality: Governance Gaps Exposed

Criminal Cases Against State Leaders and Police Brutality: Governance Gaps Exposed

The Association for Democratic Reforms (ADR) found that 45 % of India’s 31 chief ministers (CMs) have criminal cases pending, with Telangana’s Revanth Reddy topping the list at 89 filings, 72 of which fall under serious sections of the Indian Penal Code. Within days, opposition leader Rahul Gandhi alleged that the Union Home Ministry, led by Amit Shah, authorised police actions that left student protesters in Delhi injured by pellet‑gun fire, a claim he was denied a floor‑time in the Lok Sabha.

The ADR analysis, released on 27 July 2026, compared self‑sworn affidavits of CMs from their last elections.

  • 14 out of 31 CMs (45 %) face at least one criminal case.
  • Revanth Reddy has 89 cases, 72 under serious IPC provisions such as criminal intimidation and promoting enmity.
  • West Bengal’s Suvendu Adhikari follows with 29 cases, 39 serious charges.
  • Karnataka’s D.K. Shivakumar records 19 cases, six serious.
  • The remaining six CMs each have a single case, the lowest count.

These figures underscore a systemic issue: the criminalisation of political leadership coexists with alleged misuse of police powers, raising questions about accountability under the Constitution.

Article 21 of the Constitution guarantees the right to life and personal liberty, a provision that courts have interpreted to include protection from arbitrary state action. The Prakash Singh Judgment (2006) built on this premise, directing the Supreme Court to formulate a set of police‑reform guidelines, including the establishment of State Police Complaints Authorities (SPCAs) and the requirement for regular performance reviews.

  • The judgment mandated a minimum of 15 % of a state’s budget for police modernisation.
  • It called for the creation of an independent police establishment board to curb political interference.
  • The Court linked the right to life to the duty of the state to prevent police excesses.

These legal mandates are meant to operationalise the principles of the Right to Information Act 2005, which empowers citizens to seek details on police investigations, disciplinary actions, and the status of pending criminal cases against public officials.

Challenges in Enforcement

Despite the Supreme Court’s directives, implementation remains patchy.

  • Only 12 % of states have fully functional SPCAs, and many lack the statutory powers to enforce recommendations.
  • The Police Act 1861 still governs recruitment and service conditions, limiting the scope for modern accountability mechanisms.
  • Data on police‑related injuries, such as those reported by student protesters, are often classified, hindering RTI‑based scrutiny.

These gaps enable a culture where political leaders with pending criminal charges can wield influence over law‑enforcement agencies, and police actions can escape transparent review.

Did You Know? The Supreme Court’s 2006 directive required each state to publish an annual “Police Performance Report” under the RTI Act, yet as of 2025, fewer than half of the states have complied, leaving a critical transparency vacuum.

Way Forward: Strengthening Oversight

A two‑pronged approach is essential. First, the Centre must enforce the SPCA framework by linking compliance to central assistance, similar to the conditional grants model used for the National Health Mission. Second, the Parliament should consider amending the Police Act 1861 to incorporate statutory provisions for independent oversight, ensuring that the right to life under Article 21 is not eroded by unchecked police power.

By aligning constitutional guarantees with robust, enforceable statutes, India can bridge the gap between the prevalence of criminal cases among its leaders and the need for a police force that upholds, rather than undermines, democratic rights.

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