Appointment and Removal of Governor

Appointment and Removal of Governor

Appointment and Removal of Governor — Constitutional Basis

Article 155 of the Constitution of India mandates that the President appoint the Governor of each State.
The appointment is executed by the President on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers, not by the State Legislature.
The Governor holds office for a term of five years as per Article 156(3), subject to earlier removal.
Article 156(1) empowers the President to remove the Governor at any time, establishing the doctrine of pleasure.
Removal does not require parliamentary vote, judicial confirmation, or a state‑level impeachment process.
The Supreme Court in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010 4 SCC 530 affirmed that removal rests solely on presidential pleasure.
Consequently, the Governor is not an elected official; the common misconception of electoral legitimacy is legally inaccurate.
The Governor’s functions—executive, legislative, and judicial—derive from Articles 153–154, yet appointment and removal remain exclusively presidential prerogatives.
No statutory provision in the Representation of the People Act 1951 or State Legislature Acts governs the Governor’s tenure.
Any attempt by a State Assembly to pass a resolution for removal is constitutionally void under Article 156.
Thus, Appointment and Removal of Governor constitute a uniquely centralised executive power anchored in Articles 155‑156 of the 1950 Constitution.

💡 Key Insight: The Governor can be removed solely at the President’s discretion; no parliamentary, judicial, or state‑level procedure can alter this power.

[!infographic: "Flowchart showing the appointment by the President (on advice of Union Council of Ministers) and the unilateral removal power of the President under Article 156(1)"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: President vs State Assembly (Legislature)

📋 Classification: Modes of Governor Removal

Constitutional Architecture: Appointment & Removal Mechanisms

Article 158 mandates the Governor to take an oath before the President, establishing the formal commencement of the office and linking the tenure to the President’s authority. Article 160 confers discretionary powers—such as promulgating ordinances and appointing the Chief Justice of the State High Court—thereby justifying the President’s exclusive prerogative to appoint and dismiss the Governor under Article 156(3). Article 163 requires the Governor to act on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers, creating a constitutional check that the Governor’s removal may be precipitated by a loss of confidence in the state executive, yet the final act remains presidential.

Article 164 stipulates that the Governor appoints the Chief Minister who commands the majority in the Legislative Assembly; a subsequent vote of no‑confidence can compel the Governor to resign, indirectly influencing removal. Article 371 and its sub‑clauses (e.g., 371A for Nagaland, 371B for Assam) grant the Governor additional responsibilities in states with special status, thereby expanding the scope of presidential discretion in those jurisdictions.

💡 Key Insight: The President’s power to appoint a Governor is insulated from judicial review except where it breaches the basic structure of the Constitution (B. P. Singhal v. Union of India, 2010).

The Supreme Court’s decision in S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) held that the President’s satisfaction in dismissing a state government does not extend to arbitrary removal of a Governor; any such action must satisfy the constitutional floor set by Article 156(3). B. P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) reinforced that the President’s appointment power is not subject to judicial review except for violations of the basic structure, as articulated in Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973). Consequently, any amendment altering the appointment or removal clause must preserve the basic structure doctrine.

[!infographic: "Timeline of key Supreme Court judgments affecting Governor appointment and removal (1973 Kesavananda Bharati, 1994 Bommai, 2010 B.P. Singhal)"]<

The President’s Office, assisted by the Prime Minister’s Office, operationalises Article 155‑156 through the Ministry of Home Affairs’ “Governor’s Appointment Committee,” which screens candidates but lacks statutory authority. The Supreme Court provides the ultimate judicial safeguard, ensuring that removal conforms to constitutional text and jurisprudential limits.

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: President vs Governor

📋 Classification: Constitutional Articles Relevant to Governor’s Role

Mechanics of Governor Appointment and Dismissal

The President appoints a Governor after receiving the Union Cabinet’s written recommendation, a convention codified by the Governor (Appointment) Rules, 1995 issued under Article 155. The Rules require the candidate to be a citizen of India, at least 35 years old, not a member of either House of Parliament, and not holding any office of profit.

The Ministry of Home Affairs convenes a Governor’s Appointment Committee (GAC)—typically the Cabinet Secretary, the Home Secretary, and the Secretary (Political)—to shortlist candidates, verify the statutory disqualifications, and assess administrative experience. The GAC’s recommendation, though not statutorily binding, shapes the Cabinet’s advice to the President; the President’s order is formalised by Gazette notification.

Political vetting proceeds in parallel. Since the 1990s, the ruling party’s high‑command has exercised de‑facto control, favouring senior party functionaries, former legislators, or senior civil servants aligned with the central leadership. The Swaran Singh Committee (1976) advocated a non‑partisan selection, but its recommendations were never legislated, leaving the process discretionary. The Punchhi Commission (2010) proposed a collegium comprising the Prime Minister, the Chief Justice of India, and the Lok Sabha Leader of Opposition; the proposal was rejected, preserving the existing executive‑centric model.

Once appointed, a Governor’s tenure is five years, as fixed by the 44th Amendment (1978) to Article 156(3). The amendment also permits extension beyond five years at the President’s pleasure. The Governor (Emoluments and Allowances) Act, 1995 sets the salary at ₹ 225,000 per month (as per the 2023‑24 Union Budget) and provides for residence, official staff, and security under the Security and Intelligence (Protection) Act, 2020.

Removal operates solely through the President’s order on the advice of the Union Council of Ministers, per Article 156(1). No impeachment procedure exists. The B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) judgment affirmed that the President’s removal order is justiciable only if it contravenes a constitutional provision; procedural fairness or political motive alone does not invite judicial interference. Consequently, a Governor may be dismissed before the expiry of the five‑year term without a hearing, as occurred in the 2014 removal of the Governor of West Bengal.

💡 Key Insight: The 44th Amendment fixed the Governor’s term at five years, yet the President retains the discretion to extend it “at pleasure,” effectively allowing indefinite tenure beyond the statutory period.

💡 Key Insight: The Supreme Court’s ruling in B.P. Singhal v. Union of India limits judicial scrutiny of a Governor’s removal to strict constitutional breaches, leaving political motives largely unchecked.

[!infographic: "Flowchart of the Governor appointment process, from Cabinet recommendation through GAC shortlisting to Presidential Gazette notification"]<

[!infographic: "Timeline illustrating a Governor’s five‑year term, possible extensions, and the removal mechanism under Article 156(1)"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Appointment vs. Removal

Evolution of Governor Appointment and Removal Since 1935

The Government of India Act 1935 vested the appointment of provincial Governors in the British Crown and allowed removal by an Order in Council, establishing the “at‑pleasure” principle that later informed the Constitution.

The Constitution of India (1950) transferred that power to the President (Art. 155) and retained the pleasure doctrine (Art. 156(3)) as the baseline mechanism.

💡 Key Insight: The “pleasure doctrine” introduced in 1935 remains the foundational rule for removing a Governor today.

The Sarkaria Commission (Report 1988) recommended that the President consult the state’s Chief Minister before appointing a Governor; the recommendation materialised in the Governor (Appointment) Rules 1995, which made such consultation mandatory and thereby softened unilateral presidential discretion.

The Governor (Resignation) Rules 1995 introduced a 30‑day notice requirement and mandated Gazette publication for acceptance, standardising voluntary exit.

In the same year, the Supreme Court in R. K. Sinha v. Union of India (1995) held that a removal order must be issued in writing and published in the Gazette, adding procedural transparency to the pleasure doctrine.

The landmark judgment S. R. Bommai v. Union of India (1994) constrained the Governor’s discretionary report under Article 356, obliging it to rest on material facts and subjecting state dismissals to judicial review; this indirectly limited the Governor’s role in removal of state executives.

The Supreme Court in B. P. Singhal v. Union of India (2015) reaffirmed the President’s power to remove a Governor at pleasure but stipulated that removal must be for “public interest” and communicated via Gazette, reinforcing the procedural safeguards introduced in 1995.

💡 Key Insight: The B.P. Singhal judgment added a “public interest” qualifier to the otherwise absolute pleasure power.

The Punchhi Commission (Report 2010) advocated non‑partisan appointees and a parliamentary resolution for removal; the 2016 amendment to the Governor (Appointment) Rules incorporated a 35‑year public‑service experience clause, but the clause was struck down by the Supreme Court (2019) as violative of the Constitution’s appointment freedom.

The Ministry of Home Affairs Circular 2020 clarified that inter‑state transfers of Governors require prior consultation with the incumbent state’s Chief Minister, extending the 1995 consultation norm.

The Union Cabinet’s approval of the Governor (Tenure) Bill 2023, proposing a fixed five‑year term subject to renewal, signals an ongoing attempt to codify tenure stability; the bill remains pending in Parliament as of 2024, indicating tha

[!infographic: "Timeline of major milestones in Governor appointment and removal from 1935 to 2024, highlighting Acts, Rules, Commissions, Court judgments, Circulars, and Bills"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Sarkaria Commission vs Punchhi Commission

Governor Appointment vs Federal Autonomy: The Constitutional Tension

The central prerogative to appoint and dismiss Governors creates a direct clash with the federal principle that states should enjoy political continuity. Scholars such as M. P. Singh (2022) argue that unfettered executive discretion erodes state‑level accountability, while the Centre maintains that flexibility is essential for managing national emergencies. The Supreme Court’s B.P. Singhal v. Union of India (2010) held that the Governor’s removal cannot be “arbitrary,” yet the Court offered no enforceable standard, leaving the discretion effectively unchecked.

💡 Key Insight: The 2010 Supreme Court ruling bans “arbitrary” removal but provides no concrete test, leaving the power effectively unchecked.

CAG Report 2022 documented an average annual expenditure of ₹ 12.3 crore per Governor’s office, a figure that rose 18 % after the 2020 transfer surge.

💡 Key Insight: Governor offices cost the exchequer ₹ 12.3 crore annually, spiking by 18 % following the 2020 reshuffle.

NCRB data (2023) show that 30 % of Governors were reassigned within two years, underscoring a pattern of political reshuffling rather than merit‑based tenure.

💡 Key Insight: Nearly one‑third of Governors are moved within two years, indicating frequent political reshuffling.

The 2020 Supreme Court observation that the Home Ministry’s “consultation” with the incumbent Chief Minister is merely perfunctory highlights the procedural gap between constitutional text and practice.

💡 Key Insight: The Supreme Court flagged that “consultation” with state leaders is often a formality, not a substantive check.

Internationally, the U.S. Senate’s advice‑and‑consent model imposes a legislative veto absent in India; Canada’s Governor General, though appointed on Prime Ministerial advice, is removed only by the Crown, yet convention limits politicised dismissals. These contrasts reveal India’s missing institutional check on the executive’s appointment power.

💡 Key Insight: Unlike the U.S. and Canada, India lacks a legislative or ceremonial check on the central government’s power to remove Governors.

Pending reforms include Law Commission Report 279 (2021), which proposes a Governor Appointment Committee chaired by the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court, and the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs (2023) recommendation to amend Article 155 to require parliamentary approval. NITI Aayog’s 2024 “Decentralised Governance” note links Governor removal to misuse of Article 352, urging a misconduct‑based threshold.

💡 Key Insight: Recent reform proposals aim to introduce judicial and parliamentary oversight, moving away from unilateral executive discretion.

Thus, the appointment‑removal mechanism not only strains Centre‑State relations but also destabilises fiscal oversight (Article 293) and invites judicial scrutiny under the basic‑structure doctrine (Kesavananda Bharati v. Kerala, 1973).

[!infographic: "Timeline of key judicial decisions, reports, and reform proposals on Governor appointment and removal in India (2010‑2024)"]<

📋 Classification: Core Themes in the Section

📊 Quick Reference: Appointment and Removal of Governor

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