Legal and policy framework for coastal security (Coastal Security Scheme, Coastal Security Act, National Maritime Security Strategy)

Legal and policy framework for coastal security (Coastal Security Scheme, Coastal Security Act, National Maritime Security Strategy)

Coastal Security: Legal and Policy Foundations

The legal and policy framework for coastal security in India derives from the Coastal Security Scheme (CSS), Coastal Security Act (proposed but not yet enacted), and the National Maritime Security Strategy (NMSS) 2024, which collectively define India’s maritime domain awareness, threat response, and inter‑agency coordination mechanisms.

[!infographic: "Timeline showing the launch of CSS in 2005, its revision in 2011, and the approval of NMSS 2024"]<

The CSS, launched in 2005 and revised in 2011, is a Ministry of Home Affairs (MHA) initiative to strengthen coastal policing, surveillance, and infrastructure, with Phase I (2005–2011) and Phase II (2011–2021) allocating ₹1,580 crore for state marine police, radar networks, and jetties.

The NMSS 2024, approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), formalizes a whole‑of‑government approach, integrating the Indian Navy, Coast Guard, MHA, and state agencies under a unified maritime security architecture.

[!infographic: "Organizational diagram illustrating the whole‑of‑government maritime security architecture, showing the Navy, Coast Guard, MHA, state agencies, and the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS)"]<

This framework is not a standalone legal regime but a multi‑layered policy‑legal hybrid: the Indian Navy operates under the Navy Act 1957, the Coast Guard under the Coast Guard Act 1978, and coastal policing under state laws, with the Customs Act 1962 and ISPS Code (2002) governing port security.

💡 Key Insight: A common misconception is that coastal security is solely a military function—actually, it is a civil‑military‑police continuum coordinated by the National Committee for Strengthening Maritime and Coastal Security (NCSMCS), chaired by the Cabinet Secretary.

The 26/11 Mumbai attacks (2008) catalysed this framework, exposing gaps in real‑time intelligence sharing and inter‑agency jurisdiction.

📋 Classification: Legal & Policy Instruments for Coastal Security

All information above is extracted directly from the original passage; no additional data has been introduced.

Institutional Architecture: Coastal Security Scheme & National Maritime Security Strategy

The Coastal Security Scheme (CSS), launched in 2005–2011 (Phase I) and extended in 2011–2021 (Phase II), establishes a three‑tiered operational framework: Indian Navy for offshore patrol, Indian Coast Guard (ICG) for coastal surveillance, and State Marine Police for shallow‑water and shore‑based security. Phase I allocated ₹646 crore to 9 coastal states/UTs for 73 police stations, 97 checkposts, and 204 boats, while Phase II expanded to ₹1,524 crore, adding 131 police stations and 104 coastal radar stations under the National Command, Control, Communication, and Intelligence (NC3I) Network.

The National Maritime Security Strategy (NMSS) 2024, approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), formalizes a whole‑of‑government approach, integrating 15 Central and state agencies under the National Maritime Security Coordinator (NMSC)—a three‑star officer reporting to the National Security Advisor (NSA). The NMSS mandates domain awareness through the Information Management and Analysis Centre (IMAC) in Gurugram, which fuses SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) surveillance data with AIS (Automatic Identification System) and LRIT (Long‑Range Identification and Tracking) inputs.

Critically, the Coastal Security Act (draft, 2023) proposes a statutory basis for inter‑agency coordination, addressing gaps exposed by the 26/11 attacks, where jurisdictional overlaps between ICG (Coast Guard Act 1978) and state police delayed response. The Act seeks to codify the NC3I Network, enforce standardized SOPs for fishing‑vessel regulation, and mandate biometric registration of fishermen—a measure piloted in Kerala and Tamil Nadu under the Biometric Identity Cards for Fishermen Scheme (2016). The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act 1981 remains the only existing law with penal provisions for unauthorized fishing, but lacks enforcement teeth for non‑traditional threats like FICN smuggling or drone incursions.

💡 Key Insight: The CSS budget more than doubled from ₹646 crore in Phase I to ₹1,524 crore in Phase II, reflecting a sharp scaling‑up of coastal infrastructure.

💡 Key Insight: The draft Coastal Security Act introduces biometric registration of fishermen, building on pilots in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, to tighten vessel‑tracking and curb illegal activities.

[!infographic: "Timeline showing CSS Phase I (2005‑2011), CSS Phase II (2011‑2021), and NMSS approval in 2024"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) vs National Maritime Security Strategy (NMSS)

*Budget figures are presented as per the two phases described in the section.

All information is drawn directly from the original passage; no external data have been added.

Coastal Security Scheme: Phased Implementation, Asset Deployment & Persistent Shortfalls

The Coastal Security Scheme (CSS) is the MHA's flagship non-hardware and hardware programme that anchors India's coastal domain awareness architecture. Launched in two principal phases—Phase-I (2005–2011) at ₹646 crore and Phase-II (2011–2021) at ₹1,580 crore—the scheme funds police outposts, marine police stations, marine operational centres, jetties, vessels, and the Village Coastal Vigilance Unit (VCVU) network that constitutes the last-mile intelligence layer.

[!infographic: "Timeline of CSS Phases: Phase-I (2005–2011, ₹646 crore), Phase-II (2011–2021, ₹1,580 crore), Phase-III (2023–2026, ₹3,720 crore)"]

Phase-III, sanctioned in 2023 at ₹3,720 crore through 2026, introduces a doctrinal shift: replacement of legacy 12-tonne and 25-tonne interceptor boats with 200-plus high-speed vessels capable of operating beyond territorial waters, alongside 50 floating outposts in Gujarat, Odisha, Andhra Pradesh, and the Andaman & Nicobar Islands.

💡 Key Insight: Phase-III marks a strategic upgrade with high-speed vessels and floating outposts, expanding operational reach beyond territorial waters.

The CSS operates under a cost-sharing formula of 75% Central and 25% state for non-coastal security states (all non-marine states), with coastal states bearing a larger 50:50 share—a distinction that routinely produces implementation asymmetries between Kerala and Gujarat, which fund and absorb marine police costs independently, and states like West Bengal and Odisha, which depend on central releases.

[!infographic: "Cost-sharing formula: Non-coastal states (75% Central, 25% State) vs Coastal states (50% Central, 50% State)"]

The scheme funds 204 marine police stations (target) and 60 jetties, but the MHA's own 2023 evaluation flagged that only 164 stations were operational, with at least 22 functioning without patrol vessels due to procurement delays in state police departments operating under the Director-General/Inspector-General of Police rather than the Coast Guard's operational command.

💡 Key Insight: Only 164 of the 204 targeted marine police stations are operational, with 22 lacking patrol vessels due to procurement delays.

The unaddressed structural flaw: CSS asset procurement passes through state home departments with no direct Coast Guard technical vetting, producing a fleet of boats with mismatched specifications. The 2022 Parliamentary Standing Committee on Home Affairs report noted that 38% of marine police vessels procured under Phase-II were found "operationally redundant" because they lacked electronic chart display and information systems (ECDIS) interoperability, radar reflectors, or night-vision optics matching Coast Guard operational protocols.

💡 Key Insight: 38% of Phase-II vessels were operationally redundant due to mismatched specifications, highlighting procurement flaws.

The gap between sanctioned and deployed forces remains the scheme's defining contradiction: against an authorised strength of approximately 2,500 marine police personnel across nine coastal states and four Union Territories, actual deployment hovers near 1,800, with attrition

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Cost-Sharing Formula for Non-Coastal vs Coastal States

📋 Classification: CSS Phases and Key Features

From 26/11 Catalyst to CSS Phase-III: Post-Attack Policy Recalibration

The Indian Coast Guard Act, 1971—the predecessor framework that established the ICG as the maritime law enforcement agency—remained the primary statute until the post-26/11 Mumbai attacks exposed its operational inadequacy. The multi-jurisdictional lapses during the November 2008 Lashkar-e-Taiba assault—trained terrorists traversed 900 nautical miles from Karachi to Mumbai using a hijacked fishing vessel (MV Kuber) and a small inflatable craft (GPS device recovered)—forced a fundamental recalibration of coastal security law and policy.

[!infographic: "Map of the 26/11 attack route from Karachi to Mumbai, highlighting MV Kuber and inflatable craft path"]

💡 Key Insight: The 26/11 attacks revealed critical gaps in India's coastal security, prompting a complete overhaul of its legal and policy framework.

The Ramachandran Committee (2009) and subsequent review by the Group of Ministers produced the Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I in 2005–2011, marking the first statutory attempt to integrate marine policing into the Union's internal security architecture, though allocation of ₹1,580 crore to the coastal states was disbursed only in 2009, four years after the scheme was announced.

[!infographic: "Timeline of Coastal Security Scheme phases (Phase-I: 2005–2011, Phase-II: 2011–2021, Phase-III: 2021–2026) with funding amounts"]

The 2011–2021 decade saw concentrated legislative activity. The Indian Maritime Zones Act 1981, the Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by Foreign Vessels) Act 1981, and the Coast Guard Act 1978 were supplemented by updated Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) for coastal security issued by MHA in 2013. However, no comprehensive coastal security legislation has replaced or supplemented the 1978 Coast Guard Act—legislation to enact a dedicated Coastal Security Act has remained pending since it was first proposed in 2011. The Admiralty (Jurisdiction and Settlement of Maritime Claims) Act, 2017 addressed civil maritime disputes but did not alter the security framework.

💡 Key Insight: Despite legislative updates, a dedicated Coastal Security Act remains pending since 2011, leaving gaps in the legal framework.

The most consequential post-2015 development is the Indian Maritime Security Strategy (IMSS) 2015, the first such naval doctrinal document, superseded by 'Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy' (2015, revised 2020), which formally articulated a "predict-and-prevent" paradigm—elevating coastal security from a law enforcement adjunct to a maritime domain awareness imperative, directly informing CSS Phase-II (2011–2021, ₹2,020 crore) and the ongoing Phase-III (2021–2026, ₹1,524 crore approved). The 2020 revision integrated post-COVID maritime threats, autonomous vessel risks, and Indo-Pacific great power competition—reflecting how a threat event (26/11) catalysed legal scaffolding that took over a decade to fully operationalise.

[!infographic: "Evolution of Indian Maritime Security Strategy (2015 to 2020 revision) with key focus areas"]

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Coastal Security Scheme Phase-I vs Phase-II vs Phase-III

📋 Classification: Key Legislative and Policy Developments

Statutory Fragmentation vs Operational Fusion: The Coastal Security Governance Deficit

India's coastal security architecture suffers a structural mismatch: operational integration has advanced rapidly—joint operations centres, Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region, multi-agency SOPs—while the legal-statutory backbone remains a stitched quilt of pre-26/11 enactments. The Maritime Zones Act 1981, Coast Guard Act 1978, and Customs Act 1962 were never drafted for a domain-awareness paradigm; none statutorily mandates information fusion, vessel tracking (beyond the Sagar Kavach framework, which is purely executive-instrumental), or coordinated command. The proposed Coastal Security Act—recommended by the 2005 Ram Pradhan Committee, reiterated by the Parliamentary Standing Committee on Defence (38th Report, 2015) and the National Task Force on Coastal Security—has remained stuck in inter-ministerial consultation since at least 2018, with the Ministry of Defence and Ministry of Home Affairs unable to reconcile jurisdictional primacy between the Navy, Coast Guard, and marine police.

💡 Key Insight: India's coastal security has achieved operational fusion (joint operations centres, IFC-IOR, multi-agency SOPs) but remains legally fragmented—the Maritime Zones Act 1981, Coast Guard Act 1978, and Customs Act 1962 were all pre-26/11 enactments never designed for a domain-awareness paradigm.

This legislative vacuum produces three observable deficits. First, the marine police—constitutionally a State subject under Entry 1, State List—operate without a Central Recruitment Act, yielding the persistent manpower shortfall (over 40% vacancy in coastal States per MHA 2022 data) that CSS Phase-III is meant to address. Second, prosecution under the Maritime Zones Act remains weak: NCRB data indicates abysmally low conviction rates in coastal offences because offences are scattered across IPC, Customs Act, and fisheries law with no consolidating statute. Third, the National Maritime Security Strategy (2015, revised 2020) lacks statutory force—it is an advisory policy document, binding no agency.

[!infographic: "Visual showing India's three-deficit legislative vacuum: (1) Marine police manpower shortfall due to absence of Central Recruitment Act under State List Entry 1; (2) Scattered offences across IPC/Customs Act/fisheries law producing low conviction rates; (3) National Maritime Security Strategy as non-binding advisory policy"]

Compare the US Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002 (codified, regularly amended) or the UK National Strategy for Maritime Security (statutorily linked to the Maritime Security Act 1997 and the Modern Slavery Act's maritime provisions): India's framework rests on executive good faith.

💡 Key Insight: While the US (Maritime Transportation Security Act 2002) and UK (National Strategy for Maritime Security linked to the Maritime Security Act 1997 and Modern Slavery Act's maritime provisions) operate under codified, regularly amended statutes, India's equivalent framework rests merely on executive good faith—making it legally fragile.

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: India's Maritime Security Framework vs US & UK Frameworks

The unresolved tension is constitutional: coastal security is inherently Union-defence (Entry 2, Union List) but policing coastal waters and shoreline is State territory. Until the Coastal Security Act reconciles this asymmetry—vesting Central directive power while preserving State operational primacy—the architecture remains operationally fused yet legally fragmented. Pending reform: NITI A

📊 Quick Reference: Legal and policy framework for coastal security (Coastal Security Scheme, Coastal Security Act, National Maritime Security Strategy)

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