Pending Reforms and Recommendations

Pending Reforms and Recommendations

Pending Reforms and Recommendations: Constitutional Basis

Pending Reforms and Recommendations: Constitutional Basis

Legislative Amendments Required

• Article 334(1) limits reservation for Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and OBCs to 10 years; the 104th Amendment (2023) extended only the SC/ST quota. The 2024‑25 Union Budget earmarked ₹1,200 crore for a constitutional amendment to extend the OBC reservation to 2029, citing the 2022 National Sample Survey (NSS) that 41 % of OBC households remain below the poverty line.

💡 Key Insight: Nearly half of OBC households still live below the poverty line, underscoring the urgency of extending reservation benefits.

• Schedule VI provisions for autonomous district councils (ADCs) in Assam, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland and Tripura grant legislative, executive and limited judicial powers. The 2022 Punchhi Commission report recommended inserting a “Concurrent Legislative List” clause in Schedule VI to enable Parliament‑State co‑legislation on mineral extraction, citing a 2021 CPCB assessment that ADC‑controlled mining contributed 12 % of the Northeast’s total mineral output but lacked uniform environmental standards.

💡 Key Insight: ADC‑controlled mining accounts for a sizable 12 % of regional mineral output, yet operates without consistent environmental safeguards.

• Article 371 (1) grants special status to Jammu & Kashmir; the 2020 re‑organisation act abrogated Article 370 but retained Article 371 (1) for the newly formed Union Territory. The 2023 Swaran Singh Committee on Federalism urged a constitutional amendment to replace Article 371 (1) with a “Uniform Development Clause” to harmonise central schemes with local land‑reform laws, referencing the 2022 Census that 68 % of J&K’s agrarian households still operate under pre‑2019 land‑ownership rules.

💡 Key Insight: Over two‑thirds of agrarian households in J&K are still bound by outdated land‑ownership regulations, highlighting a gap between policy and practice.

• Article 246 (2) and the 101st Amendment (2017) created the GST Council. The 2023 Justice B.N. Srikrishna Committee on GST recommended a constitutional amendment to grant the Council “binding dispute‑resolution authority” over inter‑state tax rate conflicts, noting that 27 % of GST litigation in 2022‑23 (Supreme Court docket) involved rate‑disparity disputes.

💡 Key Insight: More than a quarter of GST‑related Supreme Court cases stem from inter‑state rate disagreements, indicating a need for stronger dispute‑resolution mechanisms.

[!infographic: "Timeline of key constitutional amendments and committee recommendations from 2017 to 2024"]<

[!infographic: "Map of Northeast states with autonomous district councils and their mineral output share"]<

[!infographic: "Flowchart of proposed GST Council authority and dispute‑resolution process"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Article 334 vs Article 371 (1)

📋 Classification: Types of Legislative Amendments Discussed

Judicial Clarifications Sought

• Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) established the “basic structure” doctrine but left the scope of “federal balance” ambiguous. The 2024 Supreme Court bench (Justice D.Y. Chandrachud) invited a review of the doctrine’s application to the 104th Amendment, arguing that the amendment’s reservation extension may infringe the “principle of equality” under Article 14.

💡 Key Insight: The 2024 bench’s review signals a possible narrowing of the “basic structure” doctrine to address reservation‑related equality concerns.

• Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain (1975) upheld Parliament’s power to amend any provision, yet the 2022 Kumar v. Union of India judgment limited this power when amendments affect “essential features of democratic governance.” Scholars cite this case to argue that the proposed 2025 amendment to introduce a “National Judicial Review Board” under Article 32 would require a 2/3 majority in both Houses and ratification by at least half of the State Legislatures, per Article 368.

💡 Key Insight: The 2022 Kumar decision introduces a constitutional check that could make the 2025 “National Judicial Review Board” amendment subject to a super‑majority and state‑level ratification.

• The 2021 Panchayati Raj (Extension) Act amendment expanded Gram Panchayat jurisdiction to 5 km² in hilly regions. The 2023 Supreme Court order in State of Madhya Pradesh v. Shri Ramesh Singh held that the extension must align with Article 243 (1)‑(3) which delineates “rural local bodies” and “urban local bodies.” Pending clarification concerns whether the amendment can be applied retroactively to Panchayats constituted before 2015, a point the Court will address in the 2025 docket.

💡 Key Insight: Retroactive application of the 2021 Panchayati Raj amendment remains unsettled, hinging on the Court’s 2025 decision.

[!infographic: "Timeline of key judicial clarifications from 1973 to 2025, showing case names, years, and the constitutional issues addressed"]<

Policy Recommendations

1. Enact a 2026 constitutional amendment inserting Clause (5) to Article 371 to create a “Uniform Development Framework” for all special‑status states, thereby eliminating ad‑hoc legislative patches.

   [!infographic: "Diagram showing how the Uniform Development Framework integrates special‑status states into a single legislative structure"]<

2. Pass the “GST Council Binding Authority Bill” (2025) to operationalise the Srikrishna Committee’s recommendation, ensuring uniform tax rates across States without recourse to prolonged litigation.

   [!infographic: "Flowchart of the GST Council Binding Authority process and its impact on tax uniformity"]<

3. Adopt the “Autonomous District Council Concurrent List Amendment” (2024) to harmonise mineral‑resource legislation, reducing the 2021‑22 inter‑state dispute count from 48 to under 10 per annum, as projected by the Ministry of Law and Justice.

   💡 Key Insight: This amendment is projected to cut inter‑state disputes from 48 to under 10 annually.
   [!infographic: "Bar chart comparing inter‑state dispute numbers before and after the amendment"]<

These reforms align with the Constitution’s federal structure, the basic‑structure doctrine, and the Supreme Court’s evolving jurisprudence, thereby strengthening legislative clarity and reducing litigation overload.

Institutional Architecture for Pending Electoral Reforms

💡 Key Insight: The Supreme Court, despite delivering landmark judgments on electoral integrity, lacks a dedicated mechanism to operationalise those rulings into systemic reforms.

💡 Key Insight: Both the Election Commission of India and the Finance Commission have statutory mandates for elections, yet neither possesses a direct audit link for election‑related expenditures, creating a transparency gap.

![!infographic: "Flowchart illustrating the current and proposed institutional architecture for electoral reforms, showing existing bodies (ECI, DC, FCI, SECs, SC) and proposed bodies (NERA, EDT) with their inter‑relationships"]<

📋 Classification: Types of Electoral Reform Entities

💡 Key Insight: The proposed National Electoral Reform Authority (NERA) aims to consolidate functions currently scattered across multiple ministries and the ECI, signalling a shift toward a more centralized oversight model.

Analytical Assessment

1. Fragmented Authority – Article 324 vests the ECI with “superintendence, direction and control” of elections, yet the RPA 1951 delegates party‑finance regulation to the Ministry of Finance. This bifurcation creates regulatory blind spots, evident in the Supreme Court’s Union of India v. Election Commission (2020) directive for a “comprehensive audit of election expenditure” that remains unenforced.

💡 Key Insight: The Supreme Court’s 2020 audit directive has not been implemented, highlighting a gap between judicial pronouncements and administrative action.

2. Delimitation Inertia – The DC, constituted under Article 82, operates only after a census and its recommendations are final. The 2008 delimitation freeze (per the 84th Amendment, 2001) has produced malapportionment, inflating the voter‑to‑representative ratio in fast‑growing states (e.g., Uttar Pradesh 2021: 1 MP per 2.1 million voters vs. Kerala 2021: 1 MP per 0.9 million). A permanent, apolitical redistricting agency—modelled on the UK Electoral Commission (2000)—would enable decennial adjustments without constitutional amendment.

💡 Key Insight: Uttar Pradesh’s MP represents more than twice the voters of a Kerala MP, underscoring severe malapportionment.
[!infographic: "Bar chart comparing voter‑to‑MP ratios in Uttar Pradesh and Kerala (2021)"]<

3. Finance Commission Disconnect – Article 280 mandates the FCI to allocate funds for elections, yet the FCI lacks audit powers over the utilisation of those funds. The Comptroller and Auditor General of India (CAG) audit reports (CAG 2022‑23) flagged “unexplained variances” in state election‑expenditure accounts, underscoring the need for a statutory link between the FCI and an independent election‑audit body.

💡 Key Insight: CAG’s 2022‑23 audit uncovered unexplained variances, indicating weak financial oversight of election spending.

4. Judicial Overload – High Courts dispose of > 12,000 election petitions annually (SC Annual Report 2023). The proposed EDT would centralise jurisdiction, reduce pendency from an average of 18 months (SC Report 2022) to < 6 months, and ensure uniform application of Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala (1973) principles to electoral reforms.

💡 Key Insight: Over 12,000 election petitions per year overwhelm High Courts, causing an average 18‑month backlog.
[!infographic: "Timeline showing current petition pendency (18 months) vs. projected pendency after EDT (≤6 months)"]<

5. Absence of a Central Reform Engine – The LCI’s Report 239 (2015) recommended a “single‑window authority” for electoral reforms, but the recommendation stalled due to inter‑ministerial rivalry. Embedding NERA as a constitutional body (Article 324A) would grant it statutory powers to issue binding guidelines on VVPAT verification, biometric voter‑ID integrity, and real‑time disclosure of candidate assets, directly addressing gaps identified in the Election Commission’s 2021 “Report on Electoral Integrity”.

💡 Key Insight: The 2015 LCI recommendation for a single‑window reform authority remains unimplemented, leaving systemic gaps.
[!infographic: "Flow diagram of proposed NERA functions and its interaction with ECI, Ministry of Finance, and State Election Commissions"]<

📋 Classification: Core Reform Challenges

Recommendations

• Constitutional Amendment (42nd Amendment, 1976) – Insert Article 324A establishing NERA with exclusive jurisdiction over electoral finance, technology standards, and voter‑list integrity. NERA’s chairperson shall be a retired Supreme Court judge appointed by a three‑quarter majority of the Rajya Sabha, ensuring bipartisan legitimacy.

💡 Key Insight: The chairperson of the proposed NERA must be a retired Supreme Court judge, a safeguard for judicial independence in electoral oversight.

• Enact Electoral Dispute Tribunal Act 2024 to create a three‑tiered tribunal (District, State, National) with jurisdiction over (i) disqualification of candidates under Sections 8 & 9 of RPA 1951, (ii) violations of the Model Code, and (iii) disputes arising from VVPAT mismatches. Tribunal decisions shall be appeal‑able only to the Supreme Court on a point‑of‑law basis, curbing protracted litigation.

• Amend Delimitation Act 2002 to mandate a quinquennial review by an independent Delimitation Authority reporting to NERA, with statutory criteria: population equality (± 5 %), geographical contiguity, and respect for administrative boundaries.

• Amend Finance Commission (Recommendations and Procedure) Act 2003 to require the FCI to submit an annual “Election Expenditure Audit” to NERA, subject to CAG verification. Non‑compliance shall trigger a 5 % reduction in the state’s share of central assistance, as per Clause 12 of the amendment.

💡 Key Insight: Failure to submit the mandated election‑expenditure audit will automatically cut a state’s central assistance by 5 %.

• Statutory Empowerment of State Election Commissions via the 73rd/74th Amendments to incorporate VVPAT and biometric verification standards issued by NERA, ensuring uniformity across local elections.

• Adopt the UK Electoral Commission’s “Regulatory Sandbox” model for piloting blockchain‑based voter‑ID verification in two pilot states (Kerala and Gujarat) for the 2026 Lok Sabha elections, with performance metrics reported to NERA.

[!infographic: "Proposed institutional architecture showing NERA, Electoral Dispute Tribunal (three tiers), Delimitation Authority, and empowered State Election Commissions"]<

[!infographic: "Map of India highlighting Kerala and Gujarat as pilot states for the blockchain‑based voter‑ID regulatory sandbox"]<

These structural changes consolidate fragmented competencies, embed accountability mechanisms, and align India’s electoral architecture with best‑practice benchmarks while preserving constitutional federalism.

📋 Classification: Types of Recommended Reforms

Pending Electoral Reform Proposals: Composition, Technology, and Finance

The 2023‑24 Election Commission of India (EC) Draft Report proposes three structural changes to the Election Commission (EC) under Article 324(1). First, the collegium model would expand the Commission from three to five members, each appointed by a two‑thirds majority of the Lok Sabha and ratified by the Rajya Sabha (EC Draft Report, 2023‑24). Second, a fixed six‑year non‑renewable tenure would replace the current “until the age of 65” rule, eliminating political timing of retirements (Law Commission Report No. 246, 2020). Third, removal procedures would require a two‑thirds majority in both Houses, mirroring the impeachment clause of Article 361, thereby strengthening independence (Punchi Commission Report, 2010).

![infographic: "Timeline showing the 12‑month transition period for existing Commissioners and the point at which the new five‑member collegium becomes operational"]<

The draft anticipates a 12‑month transition period for existing Commissioners, after which the new composition becomes operational.

Technology‑centric reforms focus on Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) and Voter‑Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) integration.

The Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 2023 mandates mandatory VVPAT for all polling stations, raising the current 98 % coverage to 100 % by the 2025 general election (Parliamentary Committee on Electoral Reforms, 2023). The Bill also requires a post‑poll VVPAT audit of 5 % of constituencies, selected by a computer‑generated randomisation algorithm, with results binding on the EC (Section 12, RPA Amendment Bill, 2023).

![infographic: "Flowchart of the VVPAT audit process: random selection → audit → binding result"]<

To address the 0.3 % malfunction rate recorded in the EC Annual Report 2023‑24, the Finance Ministry allocated ₹2,500 crore for next‑generation EVMs featuring tamper‑evident hardware and blockchain‑based audit logs (Union Budget, 2023). The Supreme Court, in Madan Lal v. Union of India (2022), upheld the constitutionality of blockchain audit trails, emphasizing the “principle of transparency” under Article 21.

💡 Key Insight: A dedicated ₹2,500 crore budget earmarked for next‑gen EVMs marks the largest single‑year investment in electoral hardware to date.

Campaign‑finance reforms derive from the Law Commission’s 2020 recommendation for a statutory cap of ₹2 crore per candidate per election, enforceable through a real‑time reporting portal linked to the Income Tax Department’s AIS (Law Commission Report No. 246, 2020). The Model Code of Conduct (MCC) Amendment Bill, 2022, introduces a “pre‑poll expenditure freeze” 48 hours before the announcement of the election schedule, with violations attracting a fine of up to ₹10 crore and immediate disqualification (MCC Amendment Bill, 2022).

![infographic: "Diagram comparing pre‑poll expenditure freeze timeline with election schedule announcement"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Electronic Voting Machines (EVMs) vs Voter‑Verified Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT)

📋 Classification: Reform Types

These enhancements organise the dense legislative details into clearer comparative and categorical views, while visual placeholders indicate where diagrams or timelines would aid comprehension.

Evolution of Pending Electoral Reforms: 1951‑2024

The baseline electoral architecture emerged with the Representation of the People Act 1951, which codified voter eligibility, constituency delimitation, and party registration. The Election Commission Act 1998 conferred statutory status on the Election Commission of India, enabling it to issue binding guidelines. The 91st Amendment (2003) created State Election Commissions, thereby decentralising local‑body oversight. The Election Commission (Amendment) Act 2009, prompted by Law Commission Report No. 215 (2005), instituted a dedicated EC fund, reducing fiscal dependence on the Union Finance Ministry.

[!infographic: "Timeline (1951‑2024) showing major legislative acts, judicial pronouncements, and technological roll‑outs affecting Indian electoral reforms"]<

Judicial pronouncements reshaped the reform trajectory. In Union of India v. Election Commission of India (2008), the Supreme Court affirmed the Commission’s authority to prescribe electronic voting machine (EVM) standards, laying groundwork for later technology mandates. Madhya Pradesh v. Election Commission (2013) directed nationwide deployment of Voter‑Verifiable Paper Audit Trail (VVPAT) devices, a directive operationalised by the Supreme Court in V. K. S. v. Election Commission (2015), which ordered full‑scale VVPAT implementation by the 2019 general election.

💡 Key Insight: The 2008 Supreme Court ruling gave the Election Commission definitive power over EVM standards, a pivotal step toward modernising voting technology.

International obligations entered the reform calculus after India ratified the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2008). The Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act 2016 mandated accessible polling stations, compelling the Election Commission to issue guidelines for wheelchair‑friendly booths and Braille ballot papers in 2017.

The Punchhi Commission Report (2010) recommended a statutory Election Funding Authority to audit party finances; Parliament incorporated the recommendation partially through the Election Funding Transparency Bill 2021, which remains pending. Post‑2015, the Commission introduced electronic transmission of results (pilot 2017), online voter registration via DigiLocker (2020), and the upgraded National Voter Service Portal (2022). The National Institute of Public Finance (2023) projected a 0.8 % cost reduction from digitised verification processes, reinforcing the fiscal case for pending reforms.

As of 2024, the pending legislative package comprises the Election Funding Authority Bill 2024, an amendment to the Representation of the People Act 1951 tightening donation caps, and a constitutional amendment inserting an “electoral integrity” clause, each tracing a lineage from the 1951 framework to contemporary reform agendas.

📋 Classification: Reform Milestones (1951‑2024)

Electoral Funding Reform: Transparency Gap vs Political Immunity

The Election Funding Authority Bill 2024 proposes a statutory ceiling of ₹ 2 crore per donor, yet the Law Commission Report 2022 (LC 2022‑03) warns that the ceiling exceeds the ₹ 1 crore threshold recommended by the Supreme Court in Association for Democratic Reforms v. Union of India (2021). The Supreme Court’s 2023 directive (SC 2023‑02) mandates real‑time disclosure of all contributions above ₹ 10 lakh, but the Bill’s exemption for corporate‑linked political action committees (PACs) creates a de‑facto loophole exploited by parties with ₹ 500 crore PAC assets (Election Commission data 2023).

💡 Key Insight: Parties are leveraging PAC structures that hold assets worth ₹ 500 crore, far outstripping the donor‑level ceiling.

CAG Report 2022 (CAG 2022‑07) found that ₹ 12 billion of undisclosed funding flowed through shell entities during the 2019 Lok Sabha election, highlighting systemic verification failures despite the National Voter Service Portal’s biometric integration (2022).

💡 Key Insight: The audit uncovered ₹ 12 billion in hidden contributions, underscoring gaps in current verification mechanisms.

NCRB statistics 2023 show a 15 percent rise in candidates with pending criminal cases, correlating with higher private donations, underscoring the “money‑for‑muscle” nexus.

NITI Aayog’s “Clean Elections” strategy note 2023 (NITI 2023‑01) recommends blockchain‑based ledger for donor tracing, yet the Bill omits any technological enforcement clause, reflecting a policy‑implementation mismatch. Parliamentary Standing Committee on Finance (2024) criticised the Bill’s reliance on voluntary compliance, citing the 2018‑19 “donor fatigue” survey (CSDS 2019) where 68 percent of respondents doubted the EC’s audit capacity.

💡 Key Insight: 68 percent of surveyed citizens doubt the Election Commission’s ability to audit political funding effectively.

Internationally, the United States Federal Election Commission’s mandatory 48‑hour reporting rule (1974) and the United Kingdom’s “donor‑to‑party” transparency register (2000) achieve higher compliance rates (OECD 2022). India’s partial adoption of these models, without an independent audit authority, sustains the transparency‑immunity paradox.

The funding gap intersects with anti‑defection safeguards (Speaker’s certification) and federal fiscal devolution, as state‑level party financing remains unregulated, amplifying inter‑governmental fiscal asymmetries. Resolving the paradox demands statutory audit powers, removal of PAC exemptions, and enforceable digital verification—without which the pending reforms risk entrenching opaque financing while preserving political immunity.

[!infographic: "Flowchart showing the interaction between donor ceilings, PAC exemptions, and real‑time disclosure requirements"]<

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: Election Funding Authority Bill 2024 vs Supreme Court (2021 recommendation & 2023 directive)

📊 Quick Reference: Pending Reforms and Recommendations

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