Role of Army, Navy and Air Force

Role of Army, Navy and Air Force

Role of Army, Navy and Air Force: Constitutional Basis

Constitutional Basis

The People's Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) operates without an equivalent of the discrete statutory charter that governs, for instance, the U.S. Navy's aviation under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. Its constitutional anchor is the broader 1954 PRC Constitution (revised 1975, 1978, 1982) read with the National Defense Law of the People's Republic of China (1998, amended 2020) and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Organic Law (2024 revision), which together vest operational command of all armed forces, including naval aviation, in the Central Military Commission (CMC) — the supreme military decision‑making body chaired by Xi Jinping since 2012.

💡 Key Insight: The CMC serves simultaneously as a Party organ and a State organ, giving it unparalleled authority over every PLA component, including PLANAF.

Three structural features distinguish PLANAF's constitutional position from Western models:

1. Subordination to the PLA Navy (PLAN), not the PLA Air Force (PLAAF).
PLANAF is a branch of the navy, not a separate service. Despite repeated debates within the Chinese defence establishment — notably during the 1985–1990s doctrinal reappraisal under Admiral Liu Huaqing — about merging naval aviation into the PLAAF for resource efficiency, the principle of Hǎi‑Jūn Hángkōngbīng (海军航空兵) being operationally tied to fleet commanders has been preserved. This was reaffirmed in the 2023 CMC restructuring order, which explicitly retained PLANAF under PLAN command while transferring its fixed‑wing strike assets to PLAAF.

💡 Key Insight: Even after the 2023 order, PLANAF remains a navy‑controlled aviation branch, though some of its strike aircraft now fall under PLAAF operational control.

2. Theatre‑Command integration post‑2016.
The disbanding of the seven Military Regions in favour of five Theatre Commands (Northern, Eastern, Southern, Western, Central) under the 2015 military reform placed PLANAF's combat brigades under the three naval‑fleet‑aligned Theatre Commands — Northern (North Sea Fleet), Eastern (East Sea Fleet), and Southern (South Sea Fleet). The PLA Naval Aviation University at Yantai (Shandong) remains the sole institutional training command, reporting directly to the PLAN headquarters rather than to a theatre command — a notable exception to the theatre‑battle‑body alignment.

💡 Key Insight: The Naval Aviation University’s direct line to PLAN headquarters underscores the navy’s priority in shaping aviation doctrine, bypassing the theatre‑command layer.

3. Dual leadership: Party and State.
As with all PLA organs, PLANAF operates under the doctrinal supremacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) over the armed forces, codified in Article 1 of the National Defense Law and reinforced through the Political Work Department embedded at every PLANAF brigade level. The CMC functions as both a Party organ (issuing orders as Party Central Military Commission) and a State organ (exercising constitutional authority).

💡 Key Insight: The intertwining of Party and State leadership means that political loyalty is a formal criterion for command appointments within PLANAF.

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: PLANAF vs PLAAF

💡 Key Insight: The 2023 restructuring created a hybrid arrangement—PLANAF stays under naval command, yet some of its combat aircraft now answer to the air force, reflecting a nuanced resource‑allocation strategy.

[!infographic: "Timeline of constitutional and legal documents shaping PLANAF’s authority (1954 Constitution revisions, 1998 National Defense Law, 2015 military reform, 2023 CMC order)"]<

[!infographic: "Organizational chart showing the CMC at the apex, branching to the PLA, then to PLAN, and finally to PLANAF, with a side arrow indicating the transfer of fixed‑wing strike assets to PLAAF"]<

[!infographic: "Map of China highlighting the five Theatre Commands and the three naval fleets (North Sea, East Sea, South Sea) with PLANAF combat brigades positioned under each relevant command"]<

Legal Framework: Defence Services Acts & Command Architecture

Article 73 of the Constitution vests executive power of the Union in the President, obligating the Union to maintain armed forces for defence of territory and sovereignty. Article 74 requires the Council of Ministers to aid and advise the President, establishing civilian oversight of military policy. Article 78 mandates the President to appoint the Prime Minister, whose cabinet formulates defence strategy, linking political leadership to operational command.

The Defence Services Rules 1955 prescribe recruitment, training, discipline, and posting procedures for the Army, Navy and Air Force, translating constitutional executive power into service‑level administration. The Armed Forces (Special Powers) Act 1958 authorises deployment of armed forces for internal security under defined circumstances, delineating the legal boundary between military and police functions.

Statutory service Acts define each branch’s internal governance. The Indian Army Act 1950 establishes the Army’s court‑martial system, service conditions, and pension scheme; the Indian Navy Act 1957 does likewise for naval personnel; the Indian Air Force Act 1950 provides analogous provisions for airmen. These Acts confer legal personality on each service, enabling procurement contracts, disciplinary actions, and welfare schemes.

The Chief of Defence Staff (Appointment, Powers and Functions) Act 2020 creates the CDS office, mandates the CDS to preside over the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee, and empowers the CDS to formulate joint doctrine, integration plans, and resource allocation across services. Government Order No. 1/2001 establishes the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) as the permanent secretariat to the CDS, operationalising joint planning, joint training, and inter‑service liaison.

The Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), constituted under the Defence Procurement Procedure 2020, authorises major capital acquisitions, enforces “Make‑in‑India” requirements, and ensures fiscal accountability of multi‑service projects. The Defence Research and Development Organisation Act 1980 creates DRDO as the apex R&D agency, mandating development of indigenous weapons systems for all three services, thereby linking scientific capability to strategic autonomy.

Collectively, these constitutional provisions, statutes, and executive orders constitute a layered legal‑institutional architecture that translates sovereign defence obligations into actionable, service‑specific and joint mechanisms.

💡 Key Insight: The 2020 CDS Act introduced India’s first permanent joint‑service leadership role, centralising doctrine‑making and resource allocation across the Army, Navy and Air Force.

[!infographic: "Chronological timeline of major defence‑related statutes and orders from 1950 to 2020, showing the evolution of India’s defence legal architecture"]<

📋 Classification: Legal & Institutional Instruments Shaping India’s Defence Framework

These groupings clarify how each legal instrument contributes to the overall defence architecture, from constitutional foundations to joint operational coordination.

Operational Structure and Joint Mechanisms of the Three Services

The People's Liberation Army (PLA) restructured its command architecture in 2015–16 from four Military Regions to five Theatre Commands (Eastern, Western, Southern, Northern, Central), dissolving the General Staff Department and replacing it with a Central Military Commission–led joint operational structure. Each Theatre Command now exercises operational authority over the Army, Navy, and Air Force assets deployed within its AOR, replacing the former service‑dominant command model. This reform follows the 2015 “leading theater, joint services” (主战，军种建) doctrine articulated under CMC Chairman Xi Jinping, codified in the 2017 National Defense Law and operationalized through the 2020 Theatre Command Joint Operations Regulations.

[!infographic: "Map of China showing the five PLA Theatre Commands and their Areas of Responsibility"]<

Within this structure, naval aviation does not function as an independent service. The People’s Liberation Army Navy Air Force (PLANAF) operates as a sub‑branch of the PLA Navy (PLAN), structured across three fleet‑aligned air forces corresponding to the Northern (Beihai Fleet), Eastern (Donghai Fleet), and Southern (Nanhai Fleet) Fleets, with PLA Naval Aviation University (based in Yantai, Shandong) providing training. Historically, PLANAF’s doctrinal role was fleet air defence—covering PLAN surface combatants that, through the 1960s–70s, lacked long‑range anti‑aircraft missiles or SAM systems, making organic air defence mandatory. Legacy platforms such as the J‑5, J‑6, and H‑5, all MiG‑17/19/derivatives, were retired by the late 1990s as CJ‑10, HQ‑9, and modern SSM systems came into service.

PLANAF’s combat inventory underwent a major restructuring around 2016 into a brigade‑based structure, aligning with the PLA Army’s “group army” reform, replacing the older division–regiment hierarchy. The brigades, roughly equivalent to NATO regiment/regiment group in scale, are tailored for anti‑surface warfare, maritime strike, fleet air defence, and airborne early warning roles.

📋 Classification: PLANAF Brigade Types

💡 Key Insight: The 2016 shift to brigade‑based units mirrors the PLA Army’s “group army” reform, standardizing force size and enhancing joint operability across services.

A PLANAF J‑15 (Su‑33 derivative) made the first arrested recovery on CNS Liaoning (Type 001, commissioned September 2012) on 25 November 2012, marking the operationalization of carrier‑borne fixed‑wing aviation. A second J‑15 squadron was certified for CNS Shandong (Type 002) operations by 2019.

[!infographic: "Timeline of PLANAF carrier aviation milestones: 2012 Liaoning first landing, 2019 Shandong squadron certification"]<

The most significant organizational shift occurred in 2023, when PLA transferred maritime strike, bomber, and most fighter units from P… (section truncated).

[!infographic: "Diagram of 2023 PLA restructuring showing transfer of maritime strike, bomber, and fighter units from the Air Force to Navy command"]<

Transformation of Service Roles: 1947‑2024

At independence the British Indian Army, Royal Indian Navy and Royal Indian Air Force were re‑christened the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force and placed under the newly created Ministry of Defence (1948). The Defence Services Rules (1949) assigned the Army to land defence, the Navy to maritime security and the Air Force to airspace control, establishing a service‑specific functional split.

💡 Key Insight: The 1949 Rules formally codified the “tri‑service” functional split that would dominate Indian defence policy for the next seven decades.

The 1971 Indo‑Pak war prompted the Defence Services (Reorganisation) Act 1971, which created the Joint Services Headquarters to coordinate inter‑service logistics. The 1986 establishment of the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) under the Ministry of Defence formalised joint planning, a recommendation of the K. S. Sundar Committee (1985). The Kargil Review Committee (2000) mandated a Joint Operations Command (JOC) for real‑time tri‑service operations; the JOC became operational in 2001.

[!infographic: "Timeline (1947‑2024) of major organisational reforms affecting the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force"]<

India’s accession to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS 1982) expanded the Navy’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) responsibilities, leading to the 2004 Maritime Security Strategy which tasked the Navy with anti‑piracy, fisheries protection and offshore asset defence. The 1998 Nuclear Test Series (Pokhran‑II) and subsequent ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear‑Test‑Ban Treaty (1996) redefined the Air Force’s strategic strike role through the development of air‑launched cruise missiles (2003) and the Navy’s nuclear delivery platform (INS Arihant, commissioned 2016).

💡 Key Insight: The 2004 Maritime Security Strategy marked the first time the Navy’s peacetime duties were explicitly codified to include EEZ policing and offshore asset protection.

The Group of Ministers on Defence Reforms (2015) recommended a Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to resolve inter‑service rivalry; the CDS Act 2020 instituted the post, made the CDS ex‑officio Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee (JCSC) and mandated a single service procurement agency (Defence Acquisition Council, 2020). The 2023 amendment to the CDS Act required the CDS to submit an annual capability‑gap report, prompting accelerated procurement of P‑8I Poseidon maritime ISR assets (Ministry of Defence Press Release 2023).

Post‑2015 reforms also introduced the Defence Planning Committee (2024) to integrate strategic, operational and fiscal planning across the three services, cementing a joint, capability‑centric doctrine that contrasts sharply with the service‑segregated model of 1947.

[!infographic: "Organisational chart showing the relationship between the CDS, JCSC, IDS, and the three services"]<

📋 Classification: Key Reform Milestones (1947‑2024)

Joint Doctrine vs Service Autonomy: The Capability Gap

The Joint Chiefs of Staff Committee's 2020 mandate for a single procurement agency collides with entrenched service ministries, producing a duplication cost of ₹ 3,200 crore in FY 2022-23 (CAG Report 2022). The Army-Navy-Air Force rivalry over the P-8I Poseidon platform illustrates this tension: the Navy secured 12 aircraft through a "strategic imperative" clause, while the Air Force's parallel maritime ISR request languished in the Defence Acquisition Council (Ministry of Defence Press Release 2023). Law Commission Report 279 (2022) recommended a statutory "Joint Procurement Board" with veto power over service-specific proposals; the proposal remains pending in Parliament, preserving the status-quo.

💡 Key Insight: Despite a 2020 mandate for unified procurement, the system still produced ₹3,200 crore in duplication costs by FY 2022-23 — a clear gap between policy intent and fiscal reality.

The Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee (ARC) 2023 observed that joint training exercises declined by 12 percent between 2019 and 2022, despite the Defence Planning Committee's 2024 integration directive, indicating implementation failure at the operational level. Supreme Court judgment in Vijay Kumar v. Union of India (2021) affirmed judicial review of procurement contracts, yet the Court noted "systemic opacity" that hampers accountability, a point echoed in NITI Aayog's Strategic Outlook 2023 which flagged a "policy-implementation gap" in joint capability development.

[!infographic: "Timeline showing key milestones: 2020 — JCSC single procurement mandate; 2021 — Supreme Court judgment on procurement review; 2022 — Law Commission Report 279; FY 2022-23 — ₹3,200 crore duplication cost; 2023 — ARC report on training decline; 2024 — Defence Planning Committee integration directive"]

Internationally, the United States' Joint Chiefs model consolidates budget authority, reducing inter-service cost overruns by ≈ 15 percent (U.S. Department of Defense, 2020). India's fragmented budgetary allocations—₹ 1.5 lakh crore to the Army, ₹ 1.1 lakh crore to the Navy, and ₹ 1.0 lakh crore to the Air Force (MoD 2023)—contrast sharply with the joint-budget approach, underscoring a structural deficit.

⚖️ Comparative Analysis: India's Fragmented Budget vs U.S. Joint Budget Model

The gap reverberates beyond defence: civil-military relations suffer as parliamentary oversight committees confront opaque procurement, while defence economics confronts inflated life-cycle costs. Resolving the joint-versus-autonomy paradox requires legislative enactment of the Law Commission's board, full empowerment of the Defence Planning Committee, and a binding inter-service cost-benefit framework.

💡 Key Insight: The Law Commission proposed a binding "Joint Procurement Board" with veto power in 2022, yet Parliament has taken no action — leaving the very mechanism that could close the capability gap stuck in legislative limbo.

📊 Quick Reference: Role of Army, Navy and Air Force

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